PROGRESS OF THE LAW.
As

MARKED

BY DECISIONS

SELECTED

FROM THE

ADVANCE

REPORTS.
BANKS AND BANKING.

Following the rule enunciated in Bank v. Legrand, 103 Pa.
309, the Court of Appeals of Kansas has decided that where
a bank holds a note signed by a principal and a
Duty to
Apply Deposit surety, and the principal has a deposit to his
to Payment credit at the bank subsequent to the maturity of
of Note
the note, the bank, while it has the right, is under
no duty to retain the deposit for the payment of the note,
therefore its failure to do so does not discharge the surety:
Citizens' Bank v. Elliott, 59 Pac. 1102.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.

Judge Lochren of the District Court (D. .Minn.) has generally been regarded as a careful and clear-headed judge, and
Foreign Ter- the stump speech which he delivered in EZ Parte
ritory of
Ortiz, IOO Fed. 955, on "The Constitution Follows
United States, the
lag," cam as a shock and a
to the
surprise
e
F
Extension of
Constitution profession.
The case arose upon an application
Thereto
for a writ of habeas corpus brought by an inhabitant of Porto Rico, who had been convicted of murder by a
military tribunal of the United States on that island. Judge
Lochren wrote a lengthy and, it must be admitted, logical
and forcible opinion, to the effect that immediately upon the
acquisition of Porto Rico by the United States the federal
constitution came into effect there, wherefore conviction could
be had only by indictment, grand and petit juries, etc.
Having thus demonstrated to his satisfaction that the constitution followed the flag, the judge turned around and
announced that all that he had said before was mere dictum,
since in the case at bar the constitution did not apply at all,
for the reason the crime and prosecution thereunder had
taken place previous to April 11, 1898, upon which date
Porto Rico became a part of the United States, by virtue ot
the ratification of the treaty between Spain and the United
States. The proceedings of the military tribunal were there416
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (Continued).

fore held to be within its jurisdiction, and the petition for the
writ was dismissed.
The excuse given by the judge for his constitutional
discussion causes a lawyer to smile. He says: "In view of
this conclusion, it might seem unnecessary to examine, even
as briefly as I have, the claim that the constitution does not
apply to newly-acquired domain of the United States, had
that claim not been urged with such confidence and amplitude
of argument, as the basis on which the decision of the case
must rest, that acquiescence might be inferred from silence."
Why could he not have said, in a dozen words, that the question, although presented and argued, was not necessary to the
decision of the case and would therefore be passed by without
comment? The answer might possibly be, in the words of
the judge, that the constitutional question has hitherto been
discussed only in "an elaborate argument of a law officer of
the war department, as well as arguments of several distinguished senators."
In 1899 the Legislature of New York passed a law providing for the imposition of taxes by counties for the purpose
Taxation for of reimbursing all county officers for expenses
incurred in criminal prosecutions, previous to the
Public
Purpose. Costs passage of the law, in which they had been aco crcions. quitted. In In Re Jensen, 6o N. Y. Suppl. 933,
Pros-ution the law was attacked on the ground that it violated
the constitution of New York in imposing taxation for a nonpublic purpose. The Supreme Court of New York, while
admitting that a law might be regarded as public which provided for reimbursement for future prosecutions, held that the
alleged moral obligation of the counties to defray the expenses
of past prosecutions did not give a public character to the
law in question.
The Supreme Court of the United States has dismissed for
want of jurisdiction, the bill in equity filed in that court by
Jurisdiction In the State of Louisana against the State of Texas,
Suits Between its governor and its health officer. The bill sought
states
to obtain relief against the action of the governor
and the health officer of Texas in instituting a practical embargo
against all goods coming into Texas from New Orleans on
the alleged ground of a yellow fever epidemic: Louisiana v.
Texas et al., 20 Sup. Ct. 25 1. The court were of the unanimous opinion that the bill should be dismissed, but the members adopted different grounds of opinion. Fuller, C. J.,
thought that the embargo by order of the governor of Texas
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was not such state action as would present a controversy
between the two states; Harlan, J., was of the opinion that
no harm had been done to the State of Louisiana, but merely
to some of the citizens thereof; and Brown, J., while intimating that, if the matter had affected all the citizens of Louisiana,
a "controversy" between the states would have arisen, based
his concurrence on the ground that the State of Louisiana
could not act on behalf of the inhabitants of New Orleans alone.
In order to render its fish and game laws effective, the Legislature of New York seems to have gone a little too far. In
1892 an act was passed (C. 488, § io) rendering it
Foreign
Commerce, a misdemeanor for a person to "have in his posFish Trade, session " certain varieties of fish during the closed
Regulation season. In People v. Buffalo Fisk Co., 62 N. Y.
Suppl. 543, the defendant, indicted under this law, defended
on the ground that the fish in question were imported from
Canada, where they had been caught. The Supreme Court
of New York held that, as to fish imported from another state
or a foreign country, the law was void, as an attempted regulation of commerce on a subject requiring a uniform system
of regulation, and therefore exclusively within the control of
Congress.
CORPORATIONS.

The laws of Kansas, in regard to the rights of creditors in
insolvent corporations, have become famous as sources of
litigation throughout the whole United States.
Right of
Creditorto Sue The latest instance where they. have been called
Stockholder, into question occurred in Woodwort]z v. Bowles, 6o
Impairment Pac. 329, decided by the Supreme Court of Kansas
itself. Under the state insolvent corporation law, each creditor
of an insolvent corporation was given a direct right of action
against the stockholders. In 1897 the Legislature of Kansas
passed an act (C. 47, §55) providing that assignees of insolvent
banks should have power to suspend the bringing of such
actions by the banks' creditors for the period of one year, during which period the assignees were required to bring suit for
the benefit of all creditors. Following Mkfechz. Bank v. Fideliy
Ins. Co., 87 Fed. 114, the court held that the separate right of
action given to the creditor was a contractual one, therefore,
as to creditors whose rights had accrued previous to 1891, the
law was vpid as an impairment of the obligation of contracts.
The late case of the Associated Press has been discussed so
widely that it is but necessary to give its citation in the
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advance reports: Inzter-Ocean Pub. Co. v. Associated Press, 56 N. E. 822. It will be remembered
Interest
that in this case the Supreme Court of Illinois
decided that the Associated Press is a quasi-public corporation ; therefore it cannot make and enforce a by-law that its
subscribers may not receive news from other sources, under
penalty of expulsion.
Associated
Press, Public

In Walter v. MLerced Acad. Asso. et al, 59 Pac. 136, the
defendants, who had been stockholders in a corporation for
six years, were sued by a creditor of the corporaSuit by
Creditor
tion for unpaid balances on their stock. The
Against
defence set up was that there was a material variStockholder ance between their agreements of subscription
to
the stock and the articles as to the purposes of the corporation. The Supreme Court of California properly held that this
defence was unavailing as against corporation creditors, but it
does not clearly appear whether the court based its decision
on the broad ground that the defendants were stockholders, or
upon the fact that by their laches in asserting their rights, the
defendants were estopped.
CRIMINAL LANW.

Rev. Stat. (U. S.) § 5418, makes it a crime to counterfeit any
"bid, proposal, guaranty, official bond, public record, affidavit
Co-nterfeiting or other writing." In United States v. AIh Won, 97
B3ank
Fed. 494, the defendant was indicted for countercertificate feiting a blank form of certificate of residence,
issued by the government to Chinese persons entitled to
remain in the country. Judge Bellinger, of the Circuit Court
(D. Or.), decided that as the form was of no value or meaning
in its blank condition, the act of the defendant did not come
within the purview of the statute.
In New York there is the generally prevailing statutory
rule that no conviction in rape may be had upon the testiCorroborative mony of the prosecutrix "unsupported by other
evidence." In People v. Page, 56 N. E. 750, the
Evidence
in Case of
Court of Appeals of New York was called upon
Rape
to consider what evidence amounted to corroboration under the statute. Held, that neither (i) the fact that the
prosecutrix made a subsequent complaint of the offence, nor
(2) that the defendant remained silent when told that this
complaint against him had been made, amounted to such corroboration as would support a conviction.
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DAMAGES.

The articles of separation between a husband and wife
included a bond given by the husband in the sum of $2,ooo,
Bond.
to secure the payment by him to his wife of $25
Recovery of per month. It was also provided in the bond that
Penal Sum if,at any time, the obligor defaulted in the payment of any of the monthly instalments for more than fifteen
days, the principal sum and interest should become due and
payable. After the obligor had defaulted for more than six
months, an action was brought on the bond for the $2,0o.
The obligor tendered the unpaid instalments and claimed that
this would relieve him from liability for the $2,ooo, but the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania decided that his contention
was without merit: Biery v. Stecke, 45 Atl. 376.
EVIDENCE.

In New York a strict construction is given to the rule
which forbids parol evidence to add to, alter or vary a written'
P.rol Eviinstrument. In Stephens v. .y, 56 N. E. 499, the
dence to
parties entered into a lease under which the lessee
Vary Lease was given the right to remove fixtures erected by
him, at the expiration of the term. When the lease had
expired, a new lease was made containing the usual covenants,
but without mention of any right on the part of the lessee to
remove the fixtures. The Court of Appeals of New York
held that parol evidence was inadmissible to show that it was
the intention of the parties to continue the agreement in
regard to the fixtures throughout the term of the second
lease.
HUSBAND AND WIFE.

The doctrine that the husband and wife:constitute one person
has been recently asserted by the Supreme Court of Florida.
AffInIty,
A statute of that state (Rev. Stat., § 967) provides
Interest
that a judge shall be disqualified from trying a
case "by reason of interest, consanguinity or affinity to either
of the parties." In State v. Wall,26 So. 1020, the wife of the
judge was the aunt of the wife of one of the parties. It was
held (I) that the judge was an "affinis " of his wife's niece,
and (2) therefore was connected by affinity with the niece's
husband, since the husband and wife were but one person in
the eye of the law.
Whether or not a wife may successfully bring an action for
the alienation of her husband's affections is a question upon
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which the courts have disagreed. In Crocker v.
Crocker,98 Fed. 702, the Circuit Court (D. Mass.)
was called upon to decide it under the law of
Massachusetts. Putnam, Jr., held that under the English
common law, which existed in Massachusetts unaffected by
statute, the mere alienation of the husband's affections did not
give a right of action to the wife, but that the loss of the husband's consortium would be an element of damage if it was the
probable consequence of any tort for which the wife could
bring suit.
Alienation of
Husbanda's
Affections

The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania declared to be a
necessity a course of practice which Pennsylvania lawyers
have hitherto adopted from abundance of caution.
Separate
Acknowedg- In Bingler v. Bowman, 45 Ati. 8o, the question
ment by
was presented whether or not the Married WoWife
men's Acts of 1848, 1887 and 1893 had relieved a
married woman from the necessity of acknowledging a deed
of her real estate separate and apart from her husband, according to the act of 1770. It was held that the Married Women's
Acts affected merely the power of married women, and not
the formality necessary for its exercise; therefore the act of
1770 was still in force.
The conservative position retained by some states to the
present day on the subject of the power of married women is
remarkable. At the present time in Virginia a
harried
Women's
married woman is not liable on her contracts,
Contracts
unless the same are made in respect to her separate
estate: Hirth v. Hirthi, 34 S. E. (Va.) 964.
INSURANCE.

In Johnson v. Ins. Co., 56 N. E. 569, the insurance policy
provided that it should become void "if the premises hereby
Vacation of insured shall become vacant by the removal of the
Premises,
owner or occupant, and so remain vacant for more
Abandonment than thirty days." There being evidence to show
that the vacancy was merely temporary in character, the
Supreme Court of Massachusetts decided that the jury were
properly instructed that provision in the policy would not
apply unless they should find that the vacancy was intended
to be permanent.
NEGLIGENCE.

One of the first fruits of R. R. v. Conroy, 20 Sup. Ct. 85, in
which, it will be remembered, the Supreme Court of the
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Fellow
United States
Servants
R. R., I12 U.

overruled the leading case of Ross v.
S. 377,is Briegalv. South.Pac.Rwy.,
98 Fed. 959, where the Circuit Court of Appeals (Ninth Circuit) held that an engineer and his fireman were fellow servants,
so as to preclude a recovery by the fireman for the negligence
of the engineer.
Schafer v. Central Rwy. Co., 6i N. Y. Suppl. (Sup. Ct.)
8o6, is authority for the propositions (i) that it is not necessary for a passenger on a street car to give notice
Alighting
from
to the conductor of his intention to alight, if
Street Car
he arises to alight at the same time another passenger does, who has given notice, and (2) that it is not negligence per se for the passenger to fail to take hold of the
railings, when alighting, to guard against a sudden starting of
the car.
PARTNERSHIP.

johnson v. Haws, 62 N. Y. Suppl. 641, raises the question
whether or not notice to a partnership creditor that one of the
Notice that partners is not to be bound relieves such partner
Partner Is not from liability.
In that case the two partners
Liable
entered upon a building operation with a provision
for Debts
in the akreement that one of them was not to be
liable for the debts. The plaintiff, having notice of this provision, supplied material for the operation and sued the partner
who was not to be held liable. The Supreme Court of New
York decided that the plaintiff was bound by his knowledge
of the agreement, bfit Ingraham, J., dissented,-on the ground
that it was against public policy to allow a partner to stipulate
for the profits of an undertaking without liability to the
creditors, and that the agreement for non-liability. was binding
only between the partners.
PRINCIPAL AND AGENT.

In lanes v. Citizens' Bank, 6o Pac. 290, an action was
brought against Fred. R. Janes on a promissory note which
was in the usual form: " "e promise to pay, etc."
Parol Evidence to Show The note was signed: "Jacob Guthrie, president
Contraet as of Enid Town Co.; Fred. R. Janes, secretary the
Agent
Enid Town Co." The Supreme Court of Oklahoma, (overruling the former case of Keokuk Co. v. Kingsland
Co., 5. Okl. 32,) decided that the note disclosed a latent
ambiguity as to whether or not the defendant sign.ed
merely in his official capacity; therefore parol evidence was
admissible on the part of Janes, to show that he signed as
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agent and that he was not to be held liable on the note. The
opinion of Hainer, J., contains a detailed review of all the authorities on the subject.
QUASI-CONTRACTS.

The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, while holding that
tolls which have been illegally exacted by navigation cornpanies may be recovered back, requires as a
Recovery
of Illegal prerequisite to the action that they shall have been
Tolls,
paid under protest. Therefore in 1on. Nay. Co.
v. Wood, 45 At. 73, it was held that in the
Protest
absence of a protest at the time of payment, or notice of an
intention to demand back the tolls, they could not be recovered.
REAL PROPERTY.
The strong tendency of courts to construe all conveyances
to husband and wife as conveyances in entireties is illustrated
Conveyance to in Sinons v. Bo/inger, 56 N. E. 23. In that case
Husband
the conveyance was to "A., and B., his wife,
and Wife
jointly." The Supreme Court of Indiana decided
that since all conveyances to husband and wife raise a strong
presumption of an estate in entireties, nothing less than the
express words, "in joint tenancy," is sufficient to create a
joint estate. The word "jointly" was therefore treated as
surplusage.
There is some question whether or not a covenant in a deed
requiring the erection of dwelling houses is broken by the
Restrictive erection of an apartment house for dwelling purCovenants, poses only. It was not necessary to pass directly
Apartment upon this question in Hurley v. Brown, 6o N. Y.
HOUSe
Suppl. 846; the Supreme Court of New York
deciding that a covenant, "to build a substantial dwelling
house to cost not less than $2,500," was not exclusive, so that
it would prevent the erection of buildings other than dwelling houses, therefore the erection of an apartment house was
no breach.
The question whether or not an easement exists in favor of
land for the flow of its surface water over a lower adjoining
Easement for property has been variously decided. There are
Flow of
many authorities both ways, and some courts
Surface Water hold that the easement exists in the country, but
that in cities every owner of property has the right to improve
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it without regard to the flow of surface waters from other properties. In Carlandv. Aurin, 53 S. W. 9.40, the question first
arose before the Supreme Court of Tennessee in regard to
city lots. It was held, in opposition to the weight of authority, that no distinction was to be made between city and country properties, but thatthe easement in favor of the upper property existed in both cases. The law on this subject has been
collected in 38 AMERICAN LAW REGISTER (N. S.) 707.
SHERIFFS.

Contrary to the rule in some states, it is held in West
Virginia that as between the parties to a suit and their privies
the return of the sheriff is conclusive and the party
Retr,
Impeachment injured by a false return has recourse against the
sheriff only. Therefore the defendant to an action cannot
deny the service of process upon him, when a return to that
effect is made, nor can he maintain a bill in equity to enjoin
the prosecution of the action under these circumstances:
MVfcClung v. McWhorter, 34 S. E. 740.
In Wells v. Johnston, 27 So. 184, an action was brought
against the sheriff for an illegal arrest. It appeared that the
Liability for plaintiff, who had been arrested, was not the person
Arrest of
named in the warrant, but that the sheriff had
Wrong Person reasonable cause to suppose that he was the person
and had acted without malice. The Supreme Court of
Louisiana at first affirmed a judgment for the defendant, but
upon rehearing decided that the liability of the sheriff was
absolute for a false arrest, and the absence of malice was to be
considered merely in mitigation of damages. Watkins, J.,
delivered a strong dissenting opinion.
STATUTE OF FRAUDS.

In Maryland, by virtue of a provision of the state constitution, the English statute of Frauds (29 Car. II.) is in force.
contractof The question lately arose whether a parol promise
Marriage
to marry came within the statute, as being a contract "not to be performed within one year." The Court of
Appeals of Maryland, in a learned and exhaustive opinion by
McSherry, C. J., after noting the fact that there is no English
authority on the subject, gives its approval to those of the
American cases which hold that this form of contract is without the purview of the statute and is therefore enforceable:
Lewis v. Tapman, 45 Atl. 459.
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SURETYSHIP.

Hyde v. Mliller, 6o N. Y. SuppI. 975, raises a very interesting question regarding the duty of a surety, before paying the
has
Release of debt, to ascertain whether or not his principal
Debtor, Duty been released. In this case A., who had made a
of Surety to mortgage, to B., conveyed the property to C., who
covenanted to assume payment of the mortgage
Ascertain
before

debt. A. thus became surety for the mortgage
debt, with C. as principal. B. brought an action
against A. and C. jointly, pending which B. and C. came to
an arrangement whereby B. released C., and this release was
entered upon the judgment roll of the action. B., however, pursued the action to a judgment against A., who paid it (in ignorance of the fact that he had been discharged from liability by
B.'s release of C.), and A. then brought an action against C. for
reimbursement. The Supreme Court of New York allowed a
recovery, holding (i) that the release of C. without notice to
A. was a fraud on A., (2) that the entry on the judgment
roll was not notice to A., and (3) that there was no duty cast
upon A., before paying B., to ascertain whether or not C. had
been released. All these propositions were denied in the dissenting opinion of Spring, J.
Payment

TRIAL.

It is generally held that in suits for personal injuries the
trial court possesses the discretion to order, or refuse to
order, the physical examination of the person
Physical
Examination injured by one of the defendant's physicians. But
of Plaintiff if such an order is made, and the subject of the
order refuses to submit to the examination, will such refusal
be allowed to prejudice any one but the person so refusing?
This was the question in Bagwell v. Atlanta St. Rwy. Co., 34
S. E. ioi8, where the plaintiff brought an action for personal
injuries to his daughter, who was nearly twenty-one years of
age. The Supreme Court of Georgia held that the refusal
of the daughter to obey an order of court decreeing the
examination did not affect the right of the father to recover,
since he had not control over his daughter's movements, and
could not compel her to undergo the examination.
Reiss v. Town of Pelham, 62 N. Y. Suppl. 607, an action
for negligence against a town, showed most remarkable conMisconduct duct on the part of the jury. On a motion for a
new trial, after verdict for the defendant, the atof Jury,
torney for the plaintiff produced affidavits, signed
Affidavits,
by all the jury, that, in their opinion, "both the
NewTrial
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village and the town should have been sued, and that the
entire damage should not be borne by the said town," and
" that the said jury believed that under the law the plaintiffs
could maintain an action against both municipalities hereafter,
or they would not have brought in a verdict for the defendant."
Gaynor, J., of the Supreme Court of New York, while severely
scoring the action of the jury as "scandalous" and "outrageous," decided that the mere fact that the jury decided the
case according to their view of the law, instead of upon the
facts of the case, did not afford a ground for setting aside the
verdict.

